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IN THE SUPREME C0 UR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

LLOYD E. LISH, JR.,

Plaintiff· Respondent,
vs.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMP ANY, a Maine corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
12474

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by
the plaintiff when a metal probe which he was holding
in his hands came in contact with the defendant's high
voltage electric power line.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in the District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Calvin
Gould, sitting with a jury. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the trial
court affirmed and for an order reforming the judgment
to add the sum of $13,675.56 which was awarded by the
verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident giving rise to this case occurred on the
morning of February 28, 1969, at a grain bin owned by
Willard R. Smith, Jr. in Holbrook, Idaho. (R. 1, T. 93,
262) The plaintiff had gone to the grain bin to obtain
samples of the grain in connection with his occupation as
a grain buyer. (T. 93)
The grain bin owned by Mr. Smith was located immediately adjacent to the south side of a highway which
runs in an east-west direction. The high voltage power
line owned by defendant was also located on the south '
side of the highway. (T. 10; See diagram of scene attach·
ed as an exhibit to R. 16) The grain bin has perma·
nently affixed ladder rungs on the north side which is
closest to the defendant's power line and was constructed
in 1946 sometime prior to the time the power line was
constructed. (T. 263, 264) At the time it was originally
constructed, the defendant's power line consisted of one
energized and one neutral line, both of which were placed
on poles which were erected without cross-arms. Ap·
proximately a year or two prior to the accident, the defend·
ant modified its power line by adding cross-arms to the
poles. This remodeling had the effect of moving the near·
2

est energized line approximately four feet closer to the
grain bin. (T. 301)
At the time of the accident, the nearest energized
wire was 9.01 feet from the grain bin according to the
plaintiff's expert and 9.77 feet from the bin according to
defendant's expert which measurements were both made
by surveying devices. (T. 10, 285) The defendant's
power line consisted of three energized wires and one
neutral wire with the voltage being 12,500 from one line
to another and 7,200 from each line to ground. (T. 298)
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The plaintiff arrived at the grain bin and took three
or four three foot sections of a probe with him and climbed up the ladder rungs and into the grain bin through the
hole in the top. (T. 96) Plaintiff assembled the sections
of the probe after he was inside of the grain bin and then
obtained the grain samples by inserting the probe down
into the grain and retracting the same. He then started
to climb out of the bin by the hole at the top with the
probe still assembled. Plaintiff had kept the probe in an
assembled condition because he was going to probe a
nearby grain bin and at this length it would fit easily into
the pickup truck which he was driving. (T. 98, 99) As
plaintiff was sitting on the grain bin with one foot in
and one foot out of the entrance hole and in the process
of removing the probe from the bin, it came in contact
with the defendant's power line, which resulted in severe
and permanently disabling injuries to plaintiff. (T. 100)
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Plaintiff had travelled the road adjacent to the
power line on other occasions and was aware of the poles
which he described as "telephone poles" but stated he was .
I
not fully aware that this was an electric power line.
1
(T. 175, 176) Plaintiff further testified that he did not
observe the power lines when coming out of the bin and
that he thinks he could tell a high voltage electrical wire '
from a telephone wire because the high voltage electric 1
wire may be insulated. (T. 189, 191) However, the
power lines involved in the accident were not insulated.
(T. 238, 239)
1

All of the employees of the defendant who testified i
at the time of the trial stated that the company has in its 1
stock as standard equipment signs which state "Danger·
High Voltage" or words to that effect and are white with
a red background. (T. 84, 85, 91) None of these signs
were placed on the grain bin or on the power line of the
1
defendant in the area where the accident occurred. The
I
defendant's employees also testified that wires identical
to the ones which plaintiff came in contact with were
used to carry from 110 to 44,000 volts and there was no
way to tell the voltage in the wire simply by looking at it.
(T. 249) They also concede that the general public knows ,
less what to guard against than experienced power cont·
pany employees and that the defendant had no measure·
ments of the distances between the power lines in ques·
tion and the grain bin until preparing for the trial of the
case. (T. 258, 261).
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Defendant's employees further admitted that the
ladder rungs on the outside of the grain bin facing the
power line and the access hole at the top were obvious
to anyone passing the area (T. 2 5 5) and that persons
would climb the bin in order to enter the same and use
mechanical grain augers to load and unload the same.
(T. 256)
Mr. Smith, the owner of the grain bin where the accident occurred, testified that prior to the time of this accident he was only familiar with brass probes which were
not in sections and were anywhere from six to ten feet in
length and that it would be very easy in using one of these
types of probes to come in contact with the defendant's
power line. (T. 267, 269) Also Galen Christensen, who
had been engaged in the grain business for twenty-seven
years, stated that in his opinion, the high voltage line in
such close proximity to a grain bin would be very hazardous to the operations in loading and unloading the bin
and in taking samples of the grain. (T. 53, 58, 59)
The case was submitted to the jury and they returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and awarded special damages in the sum of $17 ,500.00 and general damages of $32,500.00. The parties
had informally agreed that the claim of the plaintiff for
loss of income, past and future, should be treated as an
item of general damages just prior to the case being submitted to the jury. (T. 319) However, the instruction concerning general damages did not include the element of
lost income. (R. 21)

5

After the verdict had been returned, the trial judge
amended the verdict by deleting the sum of $13,675.56
from the award for special damages. (T. 319-321) There.
after, the plaintiff made a motion to reform the verdict
by adding the sum deleted from the award for special
damages to the sum awarded for general damages (R. 27)
which motion was denied by the Court. (R. 28, 30)

ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE
TRIAL COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.
There are numerous cases supporting the general
proposition of law stated in Point I. and no cases havt
been found by respondent stating a contrary position.
There is not only a presumption of validity on appeal
of the judgment and proceedings in the trial court, but the
burden is on the appellant affirmatively to demonstrate
error, and in the absence of such, the judgment must be
affirmed by the reviewing court. Whitehead v. Adair,
10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utali
2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. In addition to being presumed to
be correct, every reasonable intendment must be indulge~
in favor of the judgment of the trial court. Burton t
Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 24)
P.2d 514; Nagle v. Club Fontainblue, 17 Utah 2d 12).
405 P.2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corporation
17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30.

6

1e

te

ie

ir,

al

to

ea

The foregoing proposition is especially true in cases
which have been submitted to a jury, and the trial court
has given its approval to the verdict by denying a motion
for a new trial as is the case here. In this regard the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Gordon v. Provo City,
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, stated as follows:
"The purpose of the trial is to afford the
parties a full and fair opportunity to present their
evidence and contentions and to have the issues
in dispute between them determined by a jury.
When this objective has been accomplished, and
the trial court has given its approval thereto by
refusing to grant a new trial, the judgment should
be looked upon with some degree of verity. The
presumption is in favor of its validity and the
burden is upon the appellant to show some persuasive reason for upsetting it. * * *" (15 Utah
2d p. 290)
POINT

II.

THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.
At the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for both
plaintiff and defendant made motions for directed verdicts which motions were denied by the court, and the
case was submitted to the jury. (T. 310, 311) The jury
was given ample and correct instructions concerning the
issue of contributory negligence. Instruction No. 9 sets
forth the general proposition that one negligent party
may not recover from another negligent party if such
negligence contributes in any degree to the cause of the
accident. Instruction No. 10 sets forth the definitions of

7

negligence, contributory negligence, ordinary care and
proximate cause in a correct fashion. In addition to the
foregoing, Instruction No. 15 given by the Court was re.
quested by the defendant and provides as follows:
"The plaintiff must exercise reasonable care for
his own safety. If you find from the evidence that the
plaintiff failed, in the exercise of due care, to observe
the power lines of the defendant, or if you find that
the plaintiff in the exercise of due care should have ob.
served the said power lines and avoided the accident and
that such failure proximately contributed in any de·
gree to the accident of which plaintiff complains, then
your verdict must be against the plaintiff, no cause of
action."

The content of this instruction was substantially reiterat·
ed in Instruction No. 18 given by the Court in advising
the jury that if the plaintiff was found to be contribu·
torily negligent, a verdict of no cause of action should be
returned. (R. 21)
This Court has repeatedly held that the issues of neg·
ligence and contributory negligence are for the jury when
reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the
party had acted as would a reasonable and prudent per·
son under the given circumstances. In reiterating this
proposition, the Supreme Court in the case of Hindmarsh
v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 466 P.2d 410,
stated as follows:

"The burden of proving the plaintiff's contributor)
negligence is upon the defendant. The trial court could
properly take the issue from the jury and rule that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of faw
only if the evidence demonstrated that fact with su~fic·
ient certainty that all reasonable minds would so ft0d.
Conversely, if the evidence is such as to permit reason·

8

able minds to differ as to whether the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence, the question is for the
jury to decide. * * *" (21 Utah 2d p. 415)
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Other cases setting forth the foregoing proposition are
Sumsion v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301,
450 P.2d 399; Grant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d
897; Jensen v. Dolan, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191; and
Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676,
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In the case of Glen v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d
308, 265 P.2d 1013, the trial court set aside a jury verdict
for plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the jury verdict and in addressing itself as to
the issue of whether or not the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law stated as follows:

"* * * Too, more than one inference can be here
drawn as to what reasonably prudent men would
do under the particular circumstances, which
makes the question of contributory negligence one
for the jury. * * *" (1 Utah 2d p. 312)
The defendant in its brief cites several cases which
set forth the general proposition that a person may be
guilty of negligence or contributory negligence as a matter of law if he either looked and failed to see what was
there to be seen or if he failed to look. Plaintiff does not
disagree with this rule, however, it is clearly inapplicable
to the fact situation of the instant case.

In this case, the plaintiff indicated that he was familiar with poles which he described as "telephone poles"
running along the highway adjacent to the grain bin.

)0'
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However, he had no specific knowledge that these were
high voltage power lines and, in fact, said he thought
power lines were covered by an insulation material, and
these lines had no such insulation. In addition, the power
pole closest to the grain bin is some fifty-six feet away in
an easterly direction. (See diagram of scene attached as an
exhibit to R.16) The plaintiff did not observe the wires
upon entering the grain bin for the purpose of probing
the same to obtain grain samples or at the time he was
exiting from the bin when the accident occurred. His testi·
mony in this regard is as follows:

"Q. Do you have 20-20 vision?
A. Yes. I wasn't looking for power lines, I
was up probing a grain bin.

* * * * *

Q. Did you -

you didn't make any observa·
tion to see how close the power line was to the
grain bin, did you, before you entered?
A. I had no reason to.

Q. But you didn't do it, did you?
A. No.
Q. And when you got to the top of the lad·

der you didn't make any observation to see the
power lines behind you, did you? To the north of
the bin.
A. No, I had no reason to.

Q. And when you came up out of the bin
and looking directly to the north and gradual!)
swung around to the east and to the southeast once
again, you made no observation as to the power
lines did you?
A. No, I never." (T.186, 188, 189)
10
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This Court has held that if the conduct being undertaken by the plaintiff justifies giving some of his attention in a direction or to matters other than those from
which the accident arose, then it cannot be said that he is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This
principle is set forth in the Hindmarsh case, supra, as
follows:
"We refocus our attention on what we have
stated above to be the critical and controlling issue in this case: defendant's contention that the
plaintiff must be held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This argument is
grounded upon this concededly correct proposition: where there is a danger plainly to be seen,
and the plaintiff fails to avoid it, it is ordinarily
ruled that she was negligent either in failing to
look or in failing to heed. However, this is subject to the qualification that if there is something
which justifies plaintiff giving part of her attenton elsewhere so that in the total circumstances it
can reasonably be believed that she was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law is not
compelled." (21 Utah 2d p. 416, 417) (Emphasis
added)
In the Hindmarsh case, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen in the defendant's parking lot on a patch of ice and
snow and was not watching at all times where her feet
were being placed due to the fact that she was also observing the movement of cars in the parking lot. Also in
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113, 380
P.2d 409, the Court pointed out that a person may not
be held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law
if there are extenuating circumstances which impair the

11

ability of the person to see the hazard or if the person is
justifiably preoccupied in looking in a different direction.
Defendant cites the case of Hale v. Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co., 192 F.2d 274 (C.A.8, S.D.) in support of its
contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. In determining whether or
not a person injured by coming in contact with an electric
power line may be held contributorily negligent as matter
of law, the courts have generally divided the cases into
categories of those fact situations where the party injured
had no special knowledge of the dangerous condition and
those cases where the person injured knew of the specific
condition faced by him or had been given a specific warning about the same. In the former fact situation, the
courts have quite universally held that the question of
contributory negligence is a matter to be submitted to the
jury and in the latter type of cases, some courts have held
that the issue of contributory negligence may be ruled on
as a matter of law.
The Hale case, cited by the defendant, is clearly with·
in the category of the cases involving fact situations
where the person knew of the danger and is so classified
in an excellent annotation covering the subject of 69
A.L.R. 2d 9. This annotation states as follows:
"In actions against the power company ~or
injuries due to contact, through a held object, ~1th
a power wire, whether the victim was contr1bu·
orily negligent has generally been held to p~esent
a question for the jury, particularly where 1t ap·
pears that he did not have knowledge of the W
cific nature which caused his injury.
12

_In some cases the question of contributory
negligence has been held for the jury without regard to the injured person's knowledge or lack of
knowledge of danger. * * *
Where it appears cases of the kind here dealt
with that the injured person had no special knowledge of electricity, and lacked particular knowledge of the dangerous condition which caused his
injury, the court generally held the question of his
contributory negligence is for the jury." (60 A.LR.
2d at p. 51, 52)
In the case of Potter v. SAC-Osage Electric Cooperative, Inc., 335 S.W. 2d 192 (Mo., '60), the plaintiff's decedent was killed while adjusting a piece of tin on top of
a grain storage bin and contacted the defendant's electric
power line which was approximately six feet above the
bin. The accident occurred only one day after the decedent's brother had received an electric shock while working on the bin. The Supreme Court of the State of
Missouri in affirming the decision of the trial court in
submitting the issue of contributory negligence stated as
follows:
"The evidence was such that a jury reasonably could have found that the decedent was guilty
of negligence which barred plaintiff's recovery.
The jury could reasonably have found that
[decedent] failed to exercise ordinary care for his
own safety commensurate with all the facts and
circumstances in evidence. We may not say, however, that reasonable men might not fairly reach
different conclusions on the evidence viewed most
favorably from plaintiff's standpoint. We therefore may not declare as a matter of law that plaintiff's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence. We are of the opinion that the trial court
properly left that to the jury."

***
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POINT

III.

THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL
COURT WERE CORRECT AND DID NOT RESULT
IN ANY PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14
Jury Instruction No. 14 which was requested by the
plaintiff and given by the Court states as follows:
"You are instructed that a high tension trans·
mission wire is one of the most dangerous things
known to man. Not only is the current deadly, but
the danger is hidden away in an innocent looking
wire ready at all times to kill or injure anyone who
touches it or comes near it. For the average citizen, there is no way of knowing whether the wire
is harmless or lethel until it is too late to do any·
thing about it. Therefore, a high degree of duty
is supposed upon one who transmits electricity in
high tension wires to see that no harm befalls a
person rightfully in proximity thereto when that
person is himself guilty of no wrong-doing. In
other words, the highest degree of care must be
used to prevent harm from coming to others.
Failure to comply with this duty by Utah
Power & Light Company would be negligence."
The first paragraph of Instruction No. 14 was taken
directly from the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association. 24
Utah 2d 292, 470 P.2d 393. In the Brigham case, the
plaintiff, a ten year old boy, was injured when he came in
contact with the defendant's high voltage power line
after the pole supporting the same had fallen. The issues
of negligence and contributory negligence were submitted
14
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the jury, and the jury returned a verdict finding the
defendant guilty of negligence and the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligence and that each was a proximate
cause of the accident.
to

Defendant contends that this instruction was erroneous and prejudicial upon the basis that some confusion
may exist as to what duty is owed by a public utility
company who transmits electric power by the interchanging of the words "high degree" and "highest degree". The
decision of this Court in the Brigham case uses these words
synonymously in setting forth the proposition that the
degree of care required by the defendant in transmitting
electrical power is greater than the degree of care required by a person or corporation engaged in activities
which are not as hazardous. To presuppose that some
prejudice resulted to the defendant by the synonymous
use of the words "high degree" and "highest degrel:! is
without foundation and is at best picayunish.
Defendant further claims that Instruction No. 14 was
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant in that it was
argumentative and constituted comment on the evidence
which is contrary to the provisions of Rule 51 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The introductory sentences in Instruction No. 14
clearly do not constitute commenting on the evidence and
were properly included in the instruction by the court in
order for the jury to be properly instructed that the standard of care required of the defendant was greater than
that of the plaintiff and the reason for this increased
15

standard. The transmission of high voltage electrical
power is a hazardous undertaking and the jury was en.
titled to be so informed.
Even if the introductory sentences of Instruction No.
14 could be considered as argumentative the same were
not prejudicial and as is pointed out by counsel for de.
fendant in its brief:

"* * * The giving of such a charge [argument·
ative] is not grounds for reversal, unless prejudice
to the party complaining results." 53 Am. Jur.,
Trial, §552.
In the instant case, the trial court fully instructed the
jury on the issues of contributory negligence and negli·
gence. In Instruction No. 8, the Court clearly pointed out
that before a recovery could be had by the plaintiff
against the defendant, there must be actionable negli·
gence on its part and stated in part as follows:

"* * * Before there can be a recovery, you must
find that the action was caused by some actionable
negligence on the part of the defendant. In your
consideration of the question of negligence, you
are limitd to the particular acts of negligence in·
dicated in these instructions. * * * "
This instruction was further amplified by Instruction No.
17 and by the other instructions given by the court. Thii
court and other courts have quite universally held that the
instructions are to be read as a whole and should be con·
sidered together by the jury without any undue emphasii
being placed on any particular instruction and the jull
is presumed to have followed this. Cromeenes v. Sa
11
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Pedro L. A. and Salt Lake Railroad Company, 37 Utah
475, I 09 Pac. 10; Cope v. Davidson, 30 Ed. 193, 180 p.
873.

1

J.

ie

111

Defendant cites the case of Ireland v. Mitchell, 359
P.2d 894 (Ore. '61) in support of its position that Instruction No. 14 was erroneous and prejudicial upon the
grounds that it recited the holding of an opinion of this
Court. A review of the Ireland case clearly indicates that
it is not error, per se, to quote from the language of a
statute or an appellate court opinion but that the trial
court must use its discretion in instructing the jury so that
they may not be confused or mislead by any legalistic or
other technical words or phrases in a statute or appellate
court opinion. In the instant case, the introductory senences to the first paragraph of Instruction No. 14 were
not legalistic or technical in nature and as indicated
above, gave the reasons that a high degree of care is imposed upon a public utility company engaged in the business of transmitting electrical power.
In addition to the foregoing, the Court clearly indicated that it expressed no opinion as to which party should
prevail and that the instructions should be considered by
a whole and that the jurors were not to single out any
single sentence from an instruction and ignore the others.
These admonitions were contained in Instruction Nos. 27
and 29 which provide as follows:

"If during this trial the Court has said or done
anything which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or positions of either
party, you will not suffer yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.
17

The Court has not intended to express, nor
to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are.
or are not, worthy of belief; what facts are, or
are not, established; nor what inferences should
be drawn from the evidence, nor which partv
should prevail. If any expression has seemed t;
indicate an opinion relating to any of these mat·
ters, you should disregard it, because you are the
exclusive judges of the facts."
"These instructions, though numbered sep·
arately, are to be considered and construed by you
as one connected whole. Each instruction should
be read and understood with reference to and as
a part of the entire charge and not as though one
instruction separately was intended to present the
whole law of the case upon any particular point.
For that reason you are not to single out any cer·
tain sentence or any individual point or instruction
and ignore the others, but you are to consider all
the instructions, as a whole, and to regard each
in the light of all the others."
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
Instruction No. 13 which was requested by the
plaintiff and given by the court provides as follows:
"You are instructed that the State of Idaho
has adopted National Bureau of Standards Ha~d·
book 81 entitled Safety Rules for the Installat10~
and Maintenance of Electric Supply and Comm11111•
cation Lines regulating the construction and op~r·
ation of electric power ines. You are further in·
structed that Section 234. C. (b) provides in part
as follows:
"GUARDING OF SUPPLY CONDUCTORS
Supply conductors of 300 volts or m~re shal~ be
properly guarded by grounded ~ondmt, _b~rri~r5·
or otherwise, under the following conditions.
18

(2) Where such supply conductors are placed
near enough to windows, verandas, fire escapes,
or other ordinarily accessible places to be exposed
to contact by persons.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the regulation
above which is designed for the safety of the plaintiff and other person engaged in similar activities,
such conduct would be negligence on the part of
defendant Utah Power and Light Company.

Defendant's first contention of error in relation to
Instruction No. 13 is that the trial court refused to include in this instruction the definition of "guarded" as defined by the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81.
A review of the record fails to indicate any request by the
defendant of an instruction setting forth the definition of
"guarded" as set forth in the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81. (R. 20)
This court has properly and quite consistently held
that the failure of a party to request a specific instruction
precludes him from asserting error on appeal because the
same was not included in the instructions given to the
jury. See Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 230 P.2d
576; Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564;
and State By and Through Road Commission v. Kendell,
20 Utah 2d 356, 438 P.2d 178.
Section 234 C. (b) of the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 81 upon which Instruction No. 13 was
based provides as follows:
(b) GUARDING OF SUPPLY CONDUCTORS
Supply conductors of 300 volts or more shall be
properly guarded by grounded conduit, barriers,
or otherwise, under the following conditions:

19

( 1) Where the clearances set forth in table 4 (rult
234, C, 4, (a), (1) cannot be obtained.

(2) Where such supply conductors are placed near
enough to windows, verandas, fire escapes, or
other ordinary accessible places, to be exposed to
contact by persons.

Note: Supply conductors in grounded metal
sheathed cable are considered to be guarded with.
in the meaning of this rule."
As is noted from the rule, there are two circumstance1
where supply conductors carrying 300 volts or more shal!
be properly guarded by grounded conduit, barriers or
otherwise. The requirement of subparagraph ( 1) is that
the wire be at least 8. 72 feet from a building, and in thi1
case, the wire was either 9.01 or 9.77 feet from the near·
est point on the silo. (T.299) Sub-subparagraph (2) of the
section upon which Instruction No. 13 was based require1
supply conductors to be guarded when they are placed
close enough to "windows, verandas, fire escapes or other
ordinary accessible places, to be exposed to contact b1
persons." Quite obviously the permanently affixed metal
ladder rungs and entrance hole at the top of the grain silo
constitutes an ordinarily accessible place where a person
may be exposed to contact by the power line maintained
by the defendant.
Defendant further contends that this section impose1
an unusually harsh burden upon them. However, as the
note from the section clearly indicates, the supply con·
ductors could have been guarded within the meaning oi
the rule by placing them in "grounded metal sheathed
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cables" which could have been done at little expense. In
this rgard, the following quotation from 26 Am. Jur. 2d,
Electricity, Gas & Steam, §122, appears appropriate:

"* * * The rule that persons controlling so dangerous and subtle an agency as electricity should
not be permitted to theorize in regard to its probable effects, or speculate upon the chances of results affecting human life, is only in accord with
reason and common sense. The wires must be
either insulated or placed beyond the danger line
of contact with persons going where they may reasonably be expected to go. * * * Indeed, in view
of the danger to human life from the maintenance
of uninsulated electric lines in a growing business
section, the factor of the expense of insulating the
lines deserves little consideration in determining
negligence of an electric company. * * *"
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
Instruction No. 17 which was given by the Court
provides as follows:
"Before you can return a verdict in favor of
the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance
of the evidence that each of the following two
propositions are true:
PROPOSITION NO. 1:
That the Defendant was negligent in one or
more of the following particulars:
A. In failing to comply with the National
Bureau of Standards handbook No. 81 relating to
guarding of supply conductors; or
B. Failing to warn the public of a hazardous
condition.
21

PROPOSITION NO. 2:
That the said negligence of the Defendant, ii
any, was the proximate cause of the injury.

. If you find that the two foregoing proposi·
t10ns are true, you should then consider the issue
of contributory negligence as later defined in thest
instructions.''
Defendant contends that Proposition No. 1 A. is incorreet
which proposition has been answered by the precedini
paragraphs dealing with Instruction No. 13.
Defendant further asserts It.1srevc.r101v No. 1'1 i1
erroneous in that there was no evidence introduced
that they had a duty to give any warning what·
ever to plaintiff or other persons similarly situated and
that defendant's requested Instruction No. 20 which seD
forth the proposition that there is no duty to warn of ao
obvious danger which was refused by the court shoull
have been given.
Instruction No. 12 which was requested by the plain·
tiff and given by the Court and to which defendant take1
no exception correctly sets forth the duty of the defend
ant in relation to the other instructions given by th(
Court. This instruction provided as follows:
"You are instructed that it was the duty 01
the defendant power company in this case to us1
that degree of care which was warranted by the
individual circumstances at different location!
along its high voltage line. In this regard'. the. d~
gree of care was increased in areas where 1t ro1gb
be reasonably anticipated that machinery wo~'
be working or that persons would be clirob1ni
structures so as to come near to or possibly in con
tact with the high voltage line."
22

In addressing itself to the question of what evidence
needs to be introduced to establish the duty owed by
the defendant, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
case of Black v. Public Service Electric and Gas Company,
56 N.J. 63, 265 A.2d 129, stated as follows:

"Expert testimony if offered might well have
been received to show that the use or posting of
warning signs was standard practice in the electrical utility industry. But in our view it was not
at all necessary. The hazard of life and limb arising from contact with lethal wires under the evidence in this case was easily comprehended by the
average juror without expert testimony. The conditions present before and at the time of the mishap and the danger associated with them were perfectly apparent and capable of analysis by any
person of ordinary understanding. We think such
persons acting in the capacity of jurors and comprehending the danger presented by the facts in
this case, were competent to decide without expert
testimony whether the duty to exercise care commensurate with the risk involved was satisfied
when the utility failed to post warning signs on
or near the poles or on the uninsulated wires themselves."
For other cases supporting this propos1t10n, see Hendersen v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 184 Kan. 691, 239
P.2d 702; and Elliott v. Black River Electric Co-op, 233
S.C. 273, 104 S.E. 2d 357.
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POINT

IV.

THE SUM OF $13,675.56 AWARDED BY THI
JURY AS SPECIAL DAMAGES SHOULD BE ADDED
TO THE JUDGMENT.
A claim for loss of wages in addition to the claim fo:
medical expenses and general damages was made by th1
plaintiff in his complaint. (R. 1) During the trial of thi!
case, there was evidence introduced to the effect that tb1
plaintiff had lost substantial amounts of income from hi!
business as a grain buyer during the time that he wru
convalescing from the injuries he sustained. (T.149-19ii
The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict ia
favor of the plaintiff and against defendant was returnee
awarding $32,500.00 general damages and $17,500.0~
special damages. (T.319)
Prior to the case being submitted to the jury, coun
sel for both sides had discussed the issue of whether or not
the claim for lost income should be treated as general or
special damages in submitting the case to the jury, and it
was agreed that same should be treated as an item ot
general damages. (T.321) However, in submitting tbii
matter to the jury, Instruction No. 19 which set forth tbe
elements which the jury could consider in awarding gen·
eral damages does not include the element of loss of io
come. (R. 21)
Instruction No. 20 stated that the medical ex·
penses should be included in any award of special
damages made, and this instruction was followed by lo·
struction Nos. 21 and 22 which correctly set forth the
24

elements which the jury could consider in awarding plaintiff damages for loss of income, however, there was no indication that these should be included in the award for
general damages.
The Court amended the verdict of the jury by deleting the sum of $13,675.56 from the award for special
damages but did not add the same to the award of general
damages. (T. 319-321) Thereafter, a motion was made by
the plaintiff to reform the verdict by adding the sum of
$13,675.56 to the award of general damages (R. 27)
which motion was denied by the court. (R. 28, 30)
It is the plaintiff's contention that the court was correct in deleting the sum of $13,675.56 from the award on
special damages made by the jury in accordance with
agreement of counsel shortly prior to the case being submitted to the jury. However, this award should have been
included to the award of general damages made by the
jury in view of their clear indication that this loss of earnings had been sustained by the plaintiff.
Although plaintiff is unable to find any Utah case
law dealing specifically with the question of whether or
not a claim for loss of income should be considered as an
item of special damages or as an item of general damages,
it is treated generally by the trial courts of this state as
being an item of general damages. However, in view of
the uncertainty in this regard and the provisions of Rule
9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires
items of special damage to be claimed specifically a claim
for loss of earnings was inserted in the complaint. The
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claim for lost earnings was made some time prior to thi
trial and was alleged to be "in the approximate sum 0
$7 ,000.00", and the evidence introduced at the time 0
trial showed lost income of from ten to fifteen thousanr
dollars as well as the loss of future income due to th1
permanent and disabling injuries sustained by the plain
tiff as a result of the accident.
From the verdict of the jury, it is clear that they in
tended to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of income.
past and future, which he had sustained and incorporat~
this item in the award of special damages. A fair readini
of the instructions given by the court indicated that th:
jury was justified in placing the award for loss of incomt
in the category of special damages, and this amoun'
should be added to the judgment which has been entered

CONCLUSION
This matter was tried by a fair and impartial jun
upon instructions which considered together set forth tbt
contentions of both parties. The verdict and judgment
entered thereon by the trial court is presumed to be cor·
rect particularly where, as here, the plaintiff's motion foi
a new trial was denied. The verdict and judgment shouli
not be reversed without showing of error which is preju
dicial to the defendant and the defendant has failed tc
demonstrate this.
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The verdict of the jury clearly indicates that they intended to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of income,
past and future, which he had sustained as a result of his
permanent and disabling injuries, and the sum of $13,675.56 should be added to the award of general damages
rather than merely deleted from the award of special
damages.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
CARMAN E. KIPP, ESQ.
]. ANTHONY EYRE, ESQ.
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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